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Iki or are the Cultures Translatable
The thesis I would like to argue with is a popular conviction
that just as it is not possible to precisely translate from one lan-
guage into another; similarly it is impossible to adequately under-
stand the foreign culture; moreover that it is impossible to describe
it using concepts from our native language.
Let’s  start  from Heidegger’s  problems.  In  long conversations
conducted in Germany with a Japanese philosopher Shuzo Kuki,
Heidegger  encountered  the  concept  of  iki  for  the  first  time.  He
wrote  about  it  in  a  peculiar  text  entitled  “From  a  conversation
between Japanese and an Asker”1. Although Shuzo Kuki, an expert
on philosophy, Western languages and the author of the excellent
book devoted to iki tried to explain away the concept of iki, Heide-
gger recognized this concept as neither translatable nor explain-
able in terms of the European thought. It was not only Heidegger
who encountered  such  difficulty.  Apart  from  a  couple  of  other
terms derived from the Japanese aesthetics such as sabi, wabi and
jugen, the term iki is considered as completely untranslatable and
what is more not understood by anybody who was not born into
and brought up in the Japanese culture. What is interesting is the
fact that it was the\ concept of iki which made Heidegger see the
problem of the unavailability of another culture.
There will be no detailed answer to the question what iki is, be-
sides it is not to be considered now. The problem is whether it is
possible  at  all  to  adequately  answer  the  question.  We  already
know that the term comes from the Japanese aesthetics. In fact, it is
1 M. Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache, Stuttgart 1959, p.
Reports on Philosophy
Nº 21/20003
Iki or are the Cultures Translatable
aesthetics that describes the term characterizing the specific fea-
tures of the behaviours and the aesthetic sense of geishas. How-
ever, not all features but only these that are iki. It is the term re-
lated to both the clothes and the behaviour, to eroticism, kittenish
ways, to specific game taking place between a woman and a man.
In an article devoted to iki, Yumiko Matsuzaki2 tries to, reffer-
ing to the analyses included in Shuzo Kuki’s considerations, put
together all aspects of the term. He comes to the conclusion that, in
fact, iki is something characteristic of the Japanese culture and it
can neither be expressed by some other term nor exhaustively de-
scribed. Because Yumiko Matsuzaki truly tried to explain what iki
is (finally to conclude that as a matter of fact it is impossible), it
would be better to believe her and give up. However, not all ap-
proaches are so cautious.
Many fictional,  as  well  as  authentic,  diaries  were  written by
people who lived for many years in the cultures that they were in-
terested in. They showed their attempts at “inculturation” as well
as all  mistakes  and mishaps as consecutive steps leading to the
better understanding of the culture. The list of such diaries would
be extremely long but their reading is a tremendous help for those
who, not having the opportunity of direct experiencing the foreign
culture,  want  to  know  something  about  it.  What  was  formerly
learned only from great travelers and adventurers in now access-
ible by means of television or feature films about China, Japan, In-
dia or Iran, not to mention films depicting the authentic, distant
cultures. Also people who did not have the specialist equipment
were the experts. Because of their work conducted in places where
they lived and where they had to act they acquired an in-depth
knowledge about the given culture. Those were missionaries, for
example Mateo Ricci, who acted in China in the second half of the
sixteenth  century  or  Roberto  de  Nobili  working  in  the  same
period, or Ippolito Desideri, who studied the learned letters in the
Tibetan monasteries in the eighteenth century. Having a particular
mission to fulfill, they did not ask themselves whether it was pos-
sible to get to know the language, customs and the way of thinking
of the country in which they happened to be. Instead, they only
wondered how to do it,  working out for themselves  unique re-
2 Y. Matsuzaki,  “Iki  game. The analysis of  iki  phenomenon on the basis of
Shuzo  Kuki’s  works”,  Aesthecism  and  Criticism,  No.2,  Jagiellonian  University,
Krakow 2002, p. 23–40. 
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search methods. The beginning of such an activity was always an
attempt at living like native inhabitants and at recognizing at least
the part of the culture. In other words, it was an individual, per-
sonal experience.
In  1983,  an American Lisa  Dalby published her  widely read
book  entitled  “Geisha”.  She  wanted  to  describe  the  world  of
geishas, which was slowly becoming a thing of the past. She tried
to understand this singular culture of “the world of delusion” and
therefore, for a short period of time, she became a geisha herself.
Having been instructed about the necessity of iki  behaving,  she
writes about applying it to different situations. She simply illus-
trates it with examples. The geishas from Fukagawa were famous
because they never wore the tabi. The sight of the bare feet, whose
paleness was emphasized by the blackness of the contours, was ex-
tremely iki. The strength of the character was thus expressed, the
feature much more important for being iki than an erotic element
present in this custom.
Certainly it is not possible to conclude what iki is from this pic-
turesque scene, but we already know something. More examples
and explanations would certainly bring us closer to the concept of
iki.
Yumiko Matsuzaki herself read a paper on a scholarly meeting
of the Division of Philosophy of Culture in the Institute of Philo-
sophy at the Jagellonian University of Cracow. She tried to present
iki using the examples of different situations in which iki is mani-
fested.  Her  audience was a  wide group of  people  who did not
know the problem but nevertheless were open and ready to under-
stand this concept. To be precise, let us add that this concept is not
familiar to an average citizen of Japan and I think that explaining it
to them would be  as difficult  as  explaining to a  Polish peasant
what dandyism was. Incidentally, this term has much in common
with iki.
Karl  Popper  wrote  about  this  gradual  approximation  of  the
meaning and also about the impediments that result from the ac-
cepted assumption that the attempts at a mutual understanding
are destined to fail  in  advance.  He showed that harmfulness  of
something that he used to call the myth of the framework. 
By  “the  myth  of  framework”  Popper  understands  the  wide-
spread and often unconsciously accepted view that all rational ar-
gumentation has to be derived form a certain system of assump-
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tions. Hence, the system of assumptions is itself always outside the
scope of a rational argumentation. It is expressed in the conviction
that all conflicts of views that occur between people who accept
different frameworks are futile and pointless because rational dis-
cussion can only be carried on within some given system of as-
sumptions. Popper thinks that such a myth is one of the biggest
threats of our times, thus undermining the unity of human kind. It
is  assumed  here  that  the  only  possible  discussion  is  the  one
between people who share the same views. Likewise they cannot
be free from these views because their assumptions are not to be
discussed. The myth of framework leads to one more problem. If
everyone is imprisoned in his/her system of framework which is,
similarly to languages,  distinct, then people of different  cultures
do not understand each other and, moreover, the mutual under-
standing is not possible. We are the prisoners of a certain frame-
work and of a certain language.  This conviction is, according to
Popper, not only false but also harmful because assuming some-
thing in advance justifies the rejection of the attempts at opening at
something new. This mistake consists here in the belief that it is
not possible to change one’s own framework.
This is connected with Popper’s criticism of the view, which ad-
vocated that every new term appearing in our statements has to be
defined. According to Popper, in the majority of issues it is not rel-
evant whether a term can be defined or not or how it is defined3.It
is enough to check whether what we talk about is comprehensible.
The definition is certainly not a means to an end.
It is an important statement, so let us try to draw some conclu-
sions form it.
To understand a culture, which, according to some researchers,
can be treated as a language, we do not need to, in the full sense of
the word, define all its terms, to give its unambiguous equivalents.
Explaining a culture is possible not by means of looking for precise
terms  but  during  a  conversation,  during  –  as  Buddhists  say  –
“mondo”, during a never-ending cycle of questions and answers.
We, once again, refer to Popper. He notices that, during a conver-
sation that is  carried on in an informal way, the explanation of
what  you  understand  by  something  depends  not  only  on  the




speaker  but  also  on  the  listener.  The  interlocutor  should  ask  a
question: do you understand now, or not?4 
The explanation is here a kind of a dialogue, during which a
continuous, unceasingly created sequence of consecutive approx-
imations  comes  into  being.  The  method  consists  in  a  gradual
presentation of the problem by means of consecutive explanations.
In a world that changes so quickly, we will never run out of such
explanations.  New  papers  written  by  conscientious  researchers
both from the West and those coming from, hitherto, “foreign” cul-
tures appear and show us “outlandish”cultures. Each and every is-
sue can be  thoroughly  analyzed  and in  invaluable,  explanatory
knowledge will be included in the following comments, footnotes
which every text, every explanatory conversation, and every dis-
cussion is fitted with. Here, in the West, the number of researchers
whose knowledge of things is so careful and competent is rising.
Their research is an important source of information for the scient-
ists and experts from the so-called grand cultures: China, Japan or
India. More and more scholars from the Eastern countries are so
well  informed  about  our  occidental  culture;  they  know  its  lan-
guages and ways of expression so well that they can tell us about
their own literature, philosophy and customs to the point and in
such a way that it becomes comprehensible for an average, edu-
cated man belonging to our civilization. Each of them is an inter-
preter,  a translator or commentator,  who presents the results  of
his/her own experience of a given culture in an explanatory dia-
logue.
The knowledge of the subject is changed on a large scale pre-
cisely due to the efforts of the specialists. In this sense it seems ob-
vious that understanding of cultures always takes place on an indi-
vidual level. It may happen, and in fact it did happen, that it is an
individual who, through his/her own objective understanding, be-
comes a translator and – adding new fragments of knowledge all
the time – initiates the whole great process of cultures permeating
themselves. Later on new people enlarge the newly gained know-
ledge  by  their  interpretations,  new  glosses  and  notes.  Thus,
nobody who would like to gather information can complain that it
is unavailable.
Thus, we deal here with a long-lasting process conducted by
the specialists (what is, I think, characteristic). Let us make it clear:
4 5. Ibid., p.
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our present knowledge about foreign cultures was and still is cre-
ated by the experts. It was great anthropologists, the researchers
together with their equipment, the creators of new methodology
who gave us the knowledge, which now creates the general set of
convictions.  Bronisław Malinowski,  Margaret  Mead,  Ruth  Bene-
dict,  Claude  Levi  Strauss  not  only  acquired  a  new  way of  ap-
proaching that which is foreign but they also had enough literary
talent to impart this to us. The science took over the role of former
travel novels.
Owing to the work of all those people, today we have such un-
hindered access to foreign cultures today as would once have been
unthinkable of. Every issue, every source text (and almost all im-
portant texts in great cultures were translated into English, and the
translation process continues) is fitted with the appropriate num-
ber of footnotes which make up the next approximation of all the
issues that cannot be clearly explained or directly translated. We
are becoming the culture of footnotes,  approximations and com-
ments.  We  are  here  not  concerned  with  boring  bibliographical
notes but with these pieces of information which (as has been hap-
pening since they started to appear in scholar texts) are regarded
by the author as something that extends beyond the text but that is
essential in order to understand the text fully. Hence, a footnote is
a text to the texts, an explanation to the explanation and it can also
consist of the comments of many people: the author, the translator,
the editor. They all add something to facilitate the understanding
of something, or at least meant well. But this structure of a foot-
note  added to a footnote,  an explanation to an explanation has
been known – we can say without exaggeration – for thousands of
years. This is how the philosophy of ancient India came into being
– as the comments to the Vedas; this is how the Middle Ages ex-
tended the exegesis of the Holy Bible.
Our attention should be directed here to one more way of en-
riching our knowledge. This time it is about a definition. These are
ostensive (deictic) definitions – definitions by indication. Let us re-
mind us here of a general example (at least in Poland). The Eskimo
has many more words describing various kinds of snow than in
other languages. Although, Polish language knows many of them,
but their meaning is comprehended only by skiers and mountain
people. Therefore,  it is said that their knowledge of snow is not
conveyable, because in other languages there are no appropriate
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concepts. Thus, it is impossible to define precisely new terms. But
you can always use demonstration: “look, it is exactly this kind of
snow”. Of course, this kind of information is the oldest one in the
history of human communication. But here want to concentrate on
the fact that the possibilities of direct indication with reference to
foreign and distant cultures are nowadays as ample as never be-
fore. It is possible to have a direct contact with an object, a beha-
vior, a ritual or a custom. It will lead to an understanding and con-
sequently to an exhaustive expression of meaning in consecutive
approximations.
Hence, there is a difference between a simple translation of a
term and a description of a state in a given language. It is true that
there is always some stylistic clumsiness, too much verbosity, but
it seems that it will exist as long as the meaning of a term is not ab-
sorbed. Then it often happens that the term is no longer translated
but a borrowing appears. Our intuition suggests that, despite the
laments of “linguists-purists”, it is not possible to substitute “bar”
or  “inn”  for  “pub”  because  it  simply  does  not  mean  the  same
thing. The moment we take over a new institution, such as e.g.,
“pub”, from other culture, we take over its name, too. Of course, it
happens only when the whole range of the word’s meaning has
pervaded to a popular awareness. At our disposal we have a long
and constantly extended list of meanings of both elements of a lan-
guage and whole structures of culture. Hence, we can look for still
new possibilities of an adequate and exhaustive description. Un-
doubtedly, new additional explanations, new footnotes written to
something that we already know will shortly appear.
As can be clearly seen, the understanding of another culture is
not an act but a process and it is essential to be open to what is for-
eign. But what is the most important thing here is the long-term,
which leads to the beginning of the act of understanding. It does
not, of course, exclude the emotional aspect. It can be a part of our
fascination induced by a different  culture;  great  masterpieces in
science and art arose from such feelings. The stimulus to knowing
new cultures can also be a deal. So far, our acquainting with for-
eign cultures took place by means of more or less forcefully articu-
lated deals: conquest, trade, or religious missions. Travelers visit-
ing foreign cultures out of curiosity to acquaint with other cultures
and scholars are rather rare exceptions. But it was they who were
convinced that getting to know that which is foreign and impart-
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ing this knowledge is possible after all. Such a conviction is an in-
dispensable precondition for every attempt at understanding. 
It seems that all the theories in which a positive answer to the
question whether we are able to get to know what foreign is in-
cludes (the essential unity, the human unity, of our grasping the
nature of reality emerging during the process of comprehending
what foreign is). Many such theories have appeared, but we can
try to order them according to similar argumentation included in
them.
The most general  and at the same time the least explanatory
theories  are  those  which  refer  common  biological  nature  of  all
people. It can be shortly expressed by means of the statement in-
cluded in the thesis of famous American neurophysiologist Karl
Pribram. If  we all  have a similar brain then our cultural  values
have to be programmed alike. On this – as Pribram notices – the
oldest and the most permanent ethic principle are based.
The other group of comments evokes the community of reality
which moulds  similar  image of  the  world.  German philosopher
Wilhelm Dilthey repeatedly and forcibly formulated such a state-
ment about inherent unity of our ways of expressing the world. He
stated that the consciousness of all people controls the same world
and creates its similar image.
This common basis can also be the basic emotional equipment
of a person, which is expressed in an individual but betraying sim-
ilar experiences of all people. Rudolf Otto sees in it (common for
all the cultures) the experience of sacrum, expressed in mysticism.
It can have a broader dimension and then the whole culture is de-
rived  form  primeval  emotions.  It  was  quite  a  popular  point  of
view in philosophy at the turn of the nineteenth and the twentieth
century.
As a matter of fact it can be reduced to the conviction about the
community of human nature but this nature boils down to an ex-
perience sphere. The later idea of Freud who traces the beginning
of culture to the primeval sense of quilt, is a certain version of this
kind of views. In Claude Levi-Strauss’s works a common structure
of unconsciousness appears in connection with the search for com-
mon unconscious structures of mind.
All this does not mean that understanding of other people is
simple. It is true that more and more people have a direct contact
with foreign people because they either live in their own country
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or are the neighbours of representatives of foreign cultures. Hence,
we could suppose that they can grasp what is essential for their
culture at once. But although this kind of contact creates the pos-
sibilities to directly experience or/and observe, it does not neces-
sarily reveal the meaning of what is distinctively given. You can
not simply understand what you are looking at and what you are
experiencing.  Polish  minorities  in  Chicago  are  here  a  good  ex-
ample. You can meet old people who have lived there and, what is
more  important,  worked  their  whole  lives  without  learning  the
language  and  without  understanding  the  rules  of  culture  other
than the ones that they need in order  to communicate with the
American  society  to  a  minimal  extent.  This  results  form  two
things. Firstly, the majorities are reserved and defensively do not
want to accept what is foreign. Secondly, they are not able to trans-
late incomprehensible elements of culture into their Polish equival-
ents because they simply do not know them. Similarly, you are not
able to find the appropriate word for an unknown word in a for-
eign language without a translator or simply a dictionary. From
mere vicinity only the understanding does not follow.
Subsequently, it seems that neither tolerance, nor the desire to
cooperate,  nor acceptance has to follow form understanding.  So
far, we have been united with foreign people either by trade or by
war, sometimes even by missionary goals. But all these relations
are  not  necessarily  contradictory.  Our  attitude  to  acquaint
ourselves or the necessity to understand resulted from this kind of
connections. However, it were always a contact with some specific
features which enabled a direct bond, even if this was a warlike
bond. After all, the latest mass-media interest in Islam culture oc-
curred after the attack on New York. Besides, it happened earlier
on.  Europe  has  never  been  indifferent  to  the  culture  of  Islamic
countries. This culture was known not only because of travel and
trade exchange but also because of instructive and very informat-
ive war conflicts. Wars were always a good motive to try to under-
stand what is foreign. In this case – the enemy.
It happened that wars were waged on the parties which (from
the very beginning) understood each other perfectly well. It suf-
fices to remind us of a long tradition of wars between Protestants
and Catholics. A perfect understanding of something that is differ-
ent may aim at its brutal change, which is perfectly confirmed by
the history of colonization.  However,  the lack of  understanding
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can only be expressed either by indifference or a fully inquisitive
acceptance  for  something  that  is  simply  new,  fascinating  and
exotic.
A belief or rather a postulate saying that the correct attitude to
something foreign is an approval (taken for granted, in advance),
or love in contact  with a person,  is  quite  general  and – from a
moral point of view – approved of. This belief, which is so beauti-
fully expressed by philosophers of dialogue, includes also an epi-
stemological moment. It is love that makes us open to the possibil-
ity of acquainting with the Other;  it is love that is the basis for
every understanding. This thesis about the acquainting ability of
positive feelings, which was so emphasized by Max Scheler, needs
to be supplemented. It is not only hatred that “blinds”. Love hap-
pens to be “blind”, too, and it can happen that a reluctant attitude
towards somebody or something makes us see the disadvantages
(or the advantages) not visible with positive attitude. It is applic-
able both to people and to cultures.
Generally, it can be stated that positive or negative attitude, a
subjective element of any cognitive act should not constitute the
basic premise in our assessing what foreign is. However, it is not
that simple because it applies to a special character of this object,
which is a culture. In a way culture is as difficult to describe neut-
rally as a person, because the description is an objectivization of
what  constitutes  the  essence  of  man and it  defines  all  relations
between people. Hence, refraining form assessment requires a con-
scious effort. However, it is not always possible and advisable. It is
not so – and it concerns all the issues connected with the accept-
ance  of  foreign  cultures  –  that  this  acceptance  is  to  encompass
these cultures or rather their features which, after a careful ana-
lysis, should be considered harmful from a moral and social point
of view. Here an assessment and sometimes taking up an active
standpoint may prove to be necessary. 
Reaching another culture does not have to result from a com-
plete approval of it. It can be an outcome of necessity, fear of being
rejected or desiring economic benefits. To cut a long story short, it
can be motivated in a number of ways. It does not have to result
form rational motives. All attempts at a uniform emotive interpret-
ation turn out to be pointless. It can be justly stated that, as far as
an initial motive for understanding can be an emotion of its own;
in  the  course  of  the  process  of  knowing  another  culture  these
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factors should be eliminated in favor of cognitive objectivity. How-
ever,  never  will  the understanding of  others  be free  from emo-
tional factors.
The  understanding  of  others  should  not  result  in  converting
what so far has been foreign “into something that would be one’s
own”. “Foreignness” is the essence of understanding. In order to
understand you have to absorb what is different but, similarly as it
happens during learning a foreign language, neither approval nor
negation has to accompany this process. It is accepting that which
is different as it is, without the desire to change it or improve it. All
in all, postulates and attempts at changing are separate processes,
for which understanding can be at least a beginning. However, it
requires not only openness but also preparation.
A person poorly educated has more difficulties not only in ad-
apting to the conditions of a new culture (to some extent it is pos-
sible, if he/she manages to find for himself/herself an appropriate
niche in it) but also in its comprehending and conscious absorbing.
Moreover, he/she cannot participate in it actively. Maybe there is
some similarity to learning a language in it. We learn the language
automatically,  unintentionally,  it  comes  to  us  and  even  is  not
“learning” in the strict sense of the word. The second language is a
learned one.  But  we will  absorb  it  much easier  if  our linguistic
awareness is fuller, if we understand our native language better. A
person who uses only a very restricted repertoire of vocabulary in
his/her native language is not able to master a foreign language to
a greater extent, unless it is accompanied by an additional educa-
tional process.
The legitimacy of such a thesis is confirmed because small chil-
dren undergo this process in a different manner. A child learns a
second  language  unconsciously,  simultaneously  with  its  native
one. Besides, a small child has no difficulties in changing the cul-
ture  for  a  different  one.  Maybe  there  exists  a  great  similarity
between learning languages and cultures. So far, however, there is
no developed methodology of teaching foreign cultures.
But there is only one thing that is important. Bringing a culture
closer to the receiver from a different cultural sphere requires not
only an open attitude but also the desire to overcome the diffi-
culties.
Understanding a culture is not a sudden insight, a flash of rev-
elation; just as learning a foreign language is not a single act but a
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process.  Similarly,  as  with  understanding  a  foreign  language,  a
different culture can never be known inside out. It rather consists
in picking up its different elements, gradual “spot-lighting” of its
manifestations in order to construct a possibly coherent,  but not
exhaustive whole later.
But we already know that the effort to explain, “the art of foot-
notes”, is the only way that the contemporary world can choose if
we do not want the mistaken conviction about the inability of mu-
tual understanding to change the dialogue of cultures into a hostile
confrontation. In a direct connection of so far foreign cultures the
conflict is highly probable.
Each culture creates the whole complex of defensive mechan-
isms and it probably can be stated that every (or almost every) cul-
ture includes elements of aggression, which, as it is in case of indi-
viduals,  is  manifested  in  confrontation  with  what  is  different.
Many researchers from the field of hermeneutics drew attention to
a  particular  inertia,  resistance  which both  the  scientific  theories
and trends in art as well as whole cultures offer to something that
even partially contradicts  them.  Emerging of  new paradigms of
science  takes  place  through/by  long-lasting  refuting  of  the
paradigms so far established. New trends in literature found their
places in violent generation disputes. In this Hegel-like vision of
the world, progress always takes place in struggle of opposites to
the new. So, resistance is at the same time inevitable and assessed
as a slowing down progress. Finally, it is regarded as a negative
phenomenon.
The situation looks different in case of the confrontation of cul-
tures. The word “confrontation” here is used on purpose. It  im-
plies the element of fight, opposition, the desire to reject or even
overcome what is different. It is needles to add that this “different”
often includes the aspect of what is new. In the history of man-
kind, meeting with other cultures led to such transformations as
emerging within the same culture new thought or artistic trend or
even new elements of technology transforming the essence of what
has been approved of so far. However, this defensive tendency ex-
pressed by the culture regarded as one’s own identity is usually
assessed positively. The comparison made between a culture and
an individual personality seems to be justified. The faster efface-
ment  of  phenomena  between  phenomena  and  quick  changes
within one’s own culture takes place, the stronger unconscious de-
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fensive mechanisms towards endangered identity are set in mo-
tion.
All  cultures  are  subject  to  changes.  They  are  threatened  by
worldly transformations. The transformations that have their own
long history. The transformations that, if you can say so, expose
what has been established and regarded as own and right  with
contact with something new. This “new” can, through violence or
merely its appeal, threaten hitherto stable structures of one’s own
culture.
The emerging of defensive mechanisms leads to interpretable
simplifications, to creating cultural stereotypes which become es-
tablished despite the persuasions of more diligently disposed re-
searchers and moralists who warn against black-and-white vision
of the world. Apart from the interpretations that call up the uncon-
scious mechanisms which control this kind of subordination of the
world,  we can here  quote  certain natural  cognitive mechanisms
which Gehlen paid attention to when he cited the Gestalt psycho-
logy. It is about the tendency to eliminate all the irregularities of
what we perceive, about the effacement of the borders of what is
blurred and out of focus in favor of distinct, sharply limited, con-
fined forms. It is a mechanism that makes it easier to function in a
too cognitively complicated reality, a mechanism that gives sense
of an arranged and easily understood world. It seems to be obvi-
ous that all attempts at violating such an ordered world meet with
opposition.
On the other hand, accepting as a fact that ethical norms, ways
of behaviour and aesthetic criteria can – even with a strong cul-
tural strength – be different from ours, undermines unshakable be-
lief in the rationality of our culture; and behaviours established in
it lose an existing sense. The negation of what is different results
from the acceptance of the model of own culture, which is obvious,
and all takes place on an unconscious level. While accepting what
is different we need to doubt in an unconditioned binding of in-
ternalized models and moral norms. The sense of threat that ac-
companies it is connected with the fact that we unconsciously feel
that we could accept this otherness that is inside us. (Gernot Bo-
hme drew attention to it.)5
Let  us  conclude:  otherness  is  recognized because  we already
possess its dark and unclear understanding, suppressed by the su-
5 7. G. Bohme, Antropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, Frankfurt a. M. !985, p.
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perego and repealing in us as fear and temptation. Were it is not
for this characteristic pre-understanding, something that is differ-
ent would not be recognizable at all. Bohme suggests that this pe-
culiar resistance to what is foreign in another culture results form
the fact that it is unconsciously regarded as possible, and what is
more, desirable but unacceptable in one’s own culture.
It is obvious that foreignness includes an implied unaware un-
derstanding, because only then it can evoke in us emotional rejec-
tion, negation of what we do not want to admit to our conscious-
ness. It can be once again stated that the elements of foreign cul-
tures that are most intensively rejected are not misunderstood, and
in their rejection the factor of ethical valuing plays a major role. It
can also take the form of a statement that what is different cannot
be understood and there is no reason to make an effort in this dir-
ection.
However,  it is the conflicts  between different  conceptual  pat-
terns that are conductive to setting free from one’s own conceptual
patterns. The development of civilization shows how fruitful such
conflicts could be. Numerous conflicts between the Greek culture
and the cultures of the East gave rise to the beginning of the West
civilization, which the Greeks were aware of.
As Popper indicates6, the situations of confrontations between
different  conceptual  patterns  were  already  described  by  Hero-
dotus. His numerous travels showed him the diversity of cultures.
Popper  also  writes  that  Herodotus  learned  to  respect  and even
achieved the ability to look at the customs and institutions of his
own country through the eyes of his barbarous landlords. How-
ever, Popper adds that Herodotus was not caught in a trap of cul-
tural relativism, and this observation is for us very significant. It
also means that he did not consider that there is no objective truth,
but that truth is different for the Greeks, the Egyptians and for the
Syrians. This comment is important, among other things, because
the last years of this attitudes led to the understanding of inter-cul-
tural relations. Let’s notice that with this attitude either confronta-
tional or understanding dialogue is out of question because there
is no truth that could be established together.
In the history of civilization we find the confrontations of cul-
tures all the time. They lead to, as many researchers’ understand-
ing, the fact that due to the multiplicity and distinctness of cultures
6 8. K. Popper, The Myth…, op.cit., p.
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our cognition of the world can become richer and fuller when we,
overcoming the fear,  mistrust and “framework”, reach this rich-
ness not  only to understand others  but also,  or maybe first and
foremost,  understand  ourselves.  Foolish  dreams about  the  com-
mon language which would unite mankind, and also create one
common culture, would lead to the fall of this culture. The stand-
ardization would lead not only to stagnation but also to a smaller
knowledge because only what is different can show us the peculi-
arity of what is ours. 
History,  to some extent,  determines and limits  an individual,
giving him/her at the same time the fullness and abundance of tak-
ing part in a culture. Similarly, an understanding reference to what
is different limits and constraints at the same time, just as all un-
derstanding does. However, it also opens new cognitive abilities
and a new range of experiences. Last but not least, it shows new
possibilities of taking part in the life of own community.
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